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I. Introduction
In preparation for the 2012 Olympic Games in London (
“Games”), the British government took drastic measures to preempt
the perceived threat of ambush marketing, which the International
Olympic Committee (“IOC”) persistently alleged was a major
concern for its official sponsors in the past. The government has
criminalized nearly all unauthorized commercial marketing activities
during the Games, such as skywriting, the use of fliers, posters,
billboards, and any other advertising activity within specifically
1
designated “event zones” around Olympic venues. These zones

* This article was awarded third-place in the 2011 International Association for the
Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP) Essay Contest.

J.D., Whittier Law School; M.A., University of Akron; B.A., Capital University.
Brian Pelanda can be reached at bpelanda@gmail.com.
1. London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act, 2006, c. 12, §§ 19–24 (Eng.);
The London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Advertising and Trading
Regulations, 2011, c. 2898, §§ 5–11 (Eng.); See Jacquelin Magnay, Games Ban on Ambush
Marketing: London 2012 Government Plans to Stop Companies Cashing in on London
Olympics and to Improve Security at Venues, DAILY TEL., Mar. 8, 2011, at 13.
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encompass all surrounding public roads, sidewalks, railway stations,
2
and even private property, as well as the airspace above. Anyone
3
who violates these prohibitions faces penalties of up to £20,000.
These anti-ambush marketing restrictions even threaten criminal
sanctions against fans at Olympic events who so much as don
promotional garb from unaffiliated companies, such as the group of
female fans at the 2010 World Cup whom officials ejected from the
stands for wearing orange dresses that advertised a Dutch brewery
4
company. Where has this category of strict prohibitions on speech
evolved from, and is the blanket silencing of all unauthorized
commercial speech during sponsored athletic events good policy?
In the marketing context, the Olympics have become nearly
synonymous with the practice of “ambush marketing,” an advertising
strategy that the International Olympic Committee and its sponsors
have complained about for nearly thirty years.
One of the
particularly notable examples of the practice occurred in 1984 when,
after Fujifilm secured the exclusive official sponsorship rights to that
year’s Olympic Games, rival Kodak cleverly secured sponsorship
both of the ABC telecast of those Games and of the U.S.A. track and
5
field team. Along similar lines, while McDonald’s was an official
sponsor of the 1994 Winter Olympic Games, rival fast food company
and non-sponsor Wendy’s aired television commercials during the
broadcast of those Games with its recognizable spokesman and
founder, Dave Thomas, participating in traditional winter Olympic
6
sports. Commentators and critics have dubbed Kodak’s ad campaign
during the 1984 Games and the Wendy’s ads during the 1994
Games—as well as a host of similar commercial marketing strategies
employed during other high profile athletic events—as “ambush
7
marketing.” Yet those who have persistently complained about
2. The London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Advertising and Trading
Regulations, 2011, c. 2898, §§ 5–6 (Eng.).
3. London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act, 2006, c. 12, § 21(3) (Eng.).
4. Magnay, supra note 1; Emine Saner, G2: Gotcha!: A Guerrilla Marketing
Campaign at the World Cup This Week Ended Up With the Perpetrators Being Arrested,
GUARDIAN, June 17, 2010, at 4; Tariq Panja and Maud van Gaal, FIFA Detains DressClad ‘Fans’ Marketing Brew-haha, TORONTO STAR, June 16, 2010, at B4.
5. Dean Crow & Janet Hoek, Ambush Marketing: A Critical Review and Some
Practical Advice, 14 MKTG. BULLETIN 1 (2003).
6. Patrick Donahue Sheridan, An Olympic Solution to Ambush Marketing: How the
London Olympics Show the Way to More Effective Trademark Law, 17 SPORTS L. J. 27, 28
(2010); Bob Garfield, Olympian Dave Thomas? Now That’s Tough Sledding, ADVERT.
AGE 52 (Feb. 7, 1994); Michael Hiestand, Ambushers Cut Into Sponsors’ Ground, USA
TODAY, June 16, 1993, at 9C.
7. Crow, supra note 5, at 2; Sheridan, supra note 6, at 28.
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ambush marketing over the past few decades have wielded the term
far too liberally, and thus a great deal of confusion exists between the
generally accepted definition of ambush marketing and the reality of
the circumstances surrounding the numerous advertising strategies
that the term is commonly used to describe.
The literature on ambush marketing typically defines the practice
as “a company’s attempt to capitalize on the goodwill, reputation, and
popularity of a particular event by creating an association without the
8
authorization or consent of the necessary parties.” On its face, this
definition describes the practice of false association, which is
explicitly prohibited in the United States under the Lanham Act, and
for which a substantial body of case law exists. Yet, despite the
innumerable cited instances of alleged ambush marketing over the
last thirty years, “there is almost no ambush marketing case law in the
9
United States.” Clearly, there must be a disconnect between the alltoo-frequent allegations of “ambush marketing” as defined above,
and the reality surrounding the marketing strategies that are often
alleged to be “ambushes.”
This article discusses who controls the discourse on “ambush
marketing” and why the discourse is flawed, the marketing strategies
commonly alleged to be “ambushes,” and the applicability of
American law to the subject. Although some have considered it to be
10
American trademark and unfair competition law
too lenient,
adequately balances the competing interests at stake in alleged

8. Stephen McKelvey, Atlanta 96: Olympic Countdown to Ambush Armageddon?, 4
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 397, 401 (1994); Jason K. Schmitz, Ambush Marketing: The OffField Competition at the Olympic Games, 3 NW. J. OF TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 203, 205
(2005); Noelle K. Nish, How Far Have We Come? A Look at the Olympic and Amateur
Sports Act of 1998, The United States Olympic Committee, and the Winter Olympic Games
of 2002, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 53, 65 (2003); Sheridan, supra note 6, at 28 (ambush
marketing is a practice whereby companies attempt to make the consumer think their
product or service is somehow affiliated with a popular sporting event or league); Jennifer
Donatuti, Can China Protect the Olympics, or Should the Olympics Be Protected from
China?, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 203, 209 (2007) (“Ambush marketing occurs each time a
non-Olympic sponsor portrays itself as an official Olympic sponsor in an effort to
‘capitalize on the goodwill, reputation, and popularity’ of the Olympics.”); See also USOC
v. AMI, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1203 (D. Colo. 2001) (the USOC characterized AMI’s
magazine as ambush marketing, i.e., an attempt to suggest association with the “Olympic
Movement”); MATTHEW BENDER, THE LAW OF ADVERT. § 10.07.01 (2010).
9. Sheridan, supra note 6, at 29. “[I]n the last twenty years . . . few ambush
marketing cases have gone to trial.” Id. at 33.
10. Id. at 29; Jamie Bischoff, Jeffery P. Curry & Ingrida Berzins, Dispatch from the
Trademark Wars: Ambush Marketing and the Arena of Sports, METRO. CORP. COUNCIL,
Feb. 2005, at 19 (referring to the U.S. legal framework under the Lanham Act as a
comparatively “tolerant legal regime”).
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ambush marketing cases and should serve as a model for the rest of
the world to follow.

II. The “Ambush Marketing” Discourse
Event sponsors, corporate stakeholders, and commentators have
discussed the issue of so-called “ambush marketing”—which is most
often alleged to occur during high profile international athletic events
such as the Olympics—primarily under the premise that the practice
transgresses ethical boundaries, regardless of whether governments
11
The International
legally permit or prohibit certain forms of it.
Olympic Committee and many others have applied the term to a
myriad of different corporate advertising strategies employed during
such events, all of which to varying degrees purportedly interfere with
or dilute “official” corporate sponsorships. The pervasive liberal use
of the term “ambush marketing” is problematic because it cloaks an
overly broad range of marketing practices with a presumed shroud of
negativity and illegality. Generalizing all commercial speech that
seeks to capitalize on the occurrence of high-profile athletic events
without authorization from event organizers as “ambush marketing”
suggests a definitive conclusion about the legality and/or the ethicality
of the practice. The pertinent question thus concerns the scope of
practices that should be confined to the label of “ambush marketing,”
and whether sufficient legal protections currently exist in the United
States to contain it.
The power to define ambush marketing and the categories of
activities it encompasses is important because it includes the ability to
influence the formation of law. For example, the IOC requires
national organizing committees of potential host countries to secure
protection of the Olympic marks and to enact special—event
12
legislation designed to curtail ambush marketing. Several countries
such as South Africa, China, and England have responded to the issue
by legislating severe criminal penalties for a host of commercial
11. See Michael Payne, Ambush Marketing: The Undeserved Advantage, 15
PSYCHOLOGY & MKTG. 323 (1998); John A. Tripodi & Max Sutherland, Ambush
Marketing—An Olympic Event, 7 J. OF BRAND MGMT. 412, 414 (2000); Sheridan, supra
note 6, at 48 (“Beyond purely monetary concerns, though, there is the basic unfairness of
ambush marketing . . .”).
12. See Olympic Charter, www.olympic.org/documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf (July
8, 2011); Host City Contract: Games of the XXX Olympiad in 2012, www.games
monitor.org.uk/files/HostCityContract.pdf (July 6, 2005); Doris Estelle Long, Trademarks
and the Beijing Olympics: Gold Medal Challenges, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
433, 436 (Spring 2008); Stephen McKelvey, As Games Approach, Time to Reconsider
Ambush Marketing, SPORTS BUS. J., Jan. 18, 2010, at 23.

2012]

AMBUSH MARKETING

345

activities carried on during high-profile international events that they
13
categorize as ambush marketing. Although Congress granted the
United States Olympic Committee (“USOC”) unprecedented
statutory protection over its registered trademarks through the
14
Amateur Sports Act in 1978, many analysts have still described the
15
United States as a comparatively “tolerant legal regime” that is
“currently underequipped to counter ambush marketing
16
However, despite such assessments, the concept of
effectively.”
ambush marketing does not expose any shortcoming in the existing
American legal framework of trademark and unfair competition law,
and any additional legislation specifically targeted toward ambush
marketing is unwarranted.
Words matter. Legal commentators, event organizers, and
corporate sponsors have used the term “ambush marketing” far too
loosely. As stated above, the literature typically defines ambush
marketing as “a company’s attempt to capitalize on the goodwill,
reputation, and popularity of a particular event by creating an
association without the authorization or consent of the necessary
17
parties.” The alleged unauthorized “creation of association” with an
event is the most problematic aspect of this definition and use of the
term because, as will be discussed below, the Lanham Act clearly
prohibits advertising that is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association . . . or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of . . .
18
The fact that few
goods, services, or commercial activities.”
purported “ambush” cases have ever been litigated through to a final
judgment indicates that what event organizers and corporate sponsors
typically allege to be “ambushes” which supposedly create consumer
confusion as to official sponsorships and endorsements in fact do not
create any likelihood of confusion.
Despite the glaring contradictions between the accepted
definition of ambush marketing and the term’s frequent application,

13. Bischoff, supra note 10; see supra note 1.
14. San Francisco Arts and Athletics, Inc. v. USOC, 483 U.S. 522, 531 (1987) (Unlike
traditional claims under the Lanham Act, under the Amateur Sports Act, “the USOC
need not prove that a contested use [of its registered marks] is likely to cause confusion,
and an unauthorized user of the [marks] does not have available the normal statutory
defenses.”).
15. Bischoff, supra note 10, at 19.
16. Sheridan, supra note 6, at 31.
17. Schmitz, supra note 8.
18. Lanham (Trademark) Act § 43(a)(1) (2006), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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the parties that stand to benefit from the overly broad use of the term
nevertheless control the discourse. These parties are event organizers
such as national Olympic committees in need of securing sponsorship
contracts, and companies willing to invest in expensive sponsorship
agreements. Although these parties claim that they are concerned
with the consumer confusion supposedly caused by the marketing
practices they label as “ambushes,” what they actually seem to be
concerned with is attaining the power to quell all unauthorized speech
relating to the high-profile athletic events that they promote. The
controversy over ambush marketing has produced the unrealistic
expectation of event organizers and corporate sponsors that
sponsorship contracts should be able to restrict the speech of third
19
parties.
The issues that allegations of ambush marketing raise essentially
pertain to trademark infringement in the context of promotional
goods and false association, for which there is an extensive body of
case law. This article argues that United States law serves as an
appropriate international model for prohibiting deceptive marketing
practices because it properly balances free speech and consumer
interests with sufficient protection for official corporate sponsors of
high-profile athletic events, and that corporate sponsors and event
organizers have no legitimate reason to expect any additional
protection.

19. Crow & Hoek point out that:
the normal commercial protections provided by trademark, copyright
and passing off laws need to be supplemented by tighter contractual
provisions between all of the parties involved in the sponsorship of an
event. If event owners and sponsors develop tighter sponsorship
contracts, they could foster more pragmatic expectations about what
sponsorship can achieve.
Crow, supra note 5, at 11. Sheridan similarly notes that “one possible solution [to ambush
marketing] is for companies and their sponsorees to address ambush marketing when they
first negotiate their sponsorship agreement.” Sheridan, supra note 6, at 40. McKelvey
also suggests that one solution to resolving the controversy “is for the Olympic Movement
to stop selling official sponsors the promise of an ambush-free environment.” Stephen
McKelvey, As Games Approach, Time to Reconsider Ambush Marketing, SPORTS BUS. J.,
Jan. 18, 2010, at 23.
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III. What Marketing Tactics Are Alleged to Be “Ambushes”?
A. General Allegations of Ambush Marketing

Patrick Sheridan has listed what he and others allege are the four
most prevalent forms of ambush marketing techniques:
(1) purchasing advertising time around an event in order
to associate a nonsponsoring company as a sponsor of the
event; (2) negotiating with individual players or teams, who
are participating in a larger sponsored event or league, to have
them endorse a nonsponsoring company; (3) using event
tickets in a promotional contest to tie a nonsponsoring
company to that event; and (4) [aggressive] marketing [by] a
20
nonsponsoring company around the location of an event. In
a slightly more specific context, one company’s event
management guide warns event organizers that. . . . Planes
flying low over an event trailing banners advertising
competitive products, signs erected without permission, and
unauthorized distribution of flyers and merchandise are all
21
examples of ambush marketing.
The problem with labeling all of the marketing techniques listed
above as “ambush marketing” is that all of them can be practiced
without creating any likelihood that consumers will be confused into
thinking that there is an association between the event and the party
employing the technique. And if no likelihood of confusion as to
association with the event exists, then event organizers and sponsors
will not be harmed and thus have no legitimate basis to complain.
But if a company’s use of any of the marketing techniques listed
above does create a likelihood that consumers will be confused as to
the company’s association with an event, the event organizers and
sponsors have a valid, well-recognized claim in the United States
under the Lanham Act.

20. Sheridan, supra note 6, at 32. John Tripodi & Max Sutherland similarly list these
four techniques as ambush marketing. Tripodi & Sutherland, supra note 11, at 417.
21. Graham Medcalf, Bang, You’re Dead!: Ambush Marketing Steps Over the Line of
Guerrilla Marketing’s Legitimacy, N.Z. MKTG. MAG. May, 2005 available at http://
business.highbeam.com/6504/article-1G1-132723009/bang-youre-dead-ambush-marketingsteps-over-line-guerrilla.
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B. Specific Ambush Allegations

Specific allegations of ambush marketing made during past
Olympic Games highlight some of the problematic gaps in the
discourse and demonstrate that event organizers and sponsors often
allege that non-sponsoring companies have engaged in ambush
marketing merely because those companies advertised in relation to
the event. Event organizers such as the IOC and its corporate
sponsors have demonstrated that they operate under the brazen
assumption that they are entitled to a niche of the market free of any
commercial competition whatsoever. They presume that no activity
done in relation to their events, or even the mere use of terminology
evocative of the existence of their events, could ever be fair or
permissible without their authorization.
During the summer of 2000, leading up to the Olympic Games in
Sydney, non-sponsor Nabisco launched an advertisement for its Fig
Newton cookies that depicted an ancient Olympic athlete throwing a
22
discus. The ad’s accompanying text read: “The ancient Olympians
23
worshipped the fig and used it for energy during training.” The
Nabisco campaign also truthfully stated that the Fig Newton was the
24
“Official Energy Food of USA Cycling.” Nabisco ran this ad in
25
PowerBar Inc., an official Olympic
several sports publications.
sponsor, complained to the USOC that Nabisco’s ad campaign
constituted ambush marketing that infringed upon its official
sponsorship status, and the USOC subsequently brought suit in
federal court, alleging that Nabisco had wrongfully tried to create an
association between its product and the USOC and the Olympic
26
Movement. Nabisco decided to discontinue its ad campaign and the
case settled out of court, so there was no judicial evaluation of
whether Nabisco’s ads violated either the Olympic Amateur Sports
Act or the Lanham Act. However, even a cursory consideration of
Nabisco’s ad—which claimed only that ancient Olympians ate figs—
suggests that, as long as the claim is true, it was most likely
permissible under the Lanham Act because it is unlikely to have
caused consumer confusion about Nabisco’s relationship to the 2000
Olympic Games. Without the use of the iconic Olympic rings or a

22.
(2001).
23.
24.
25.
26.

Anne M. Wall, The Game Behind the Games, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 1243, 1261
Id.
Id.
Id.
USOC v. Nabisco, Inc., Case No. C-00-3086, 10–11 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 25, 2000).
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direct reference to the Summer Games, it would be a stretch to argue
that consumers would likely have thought that Nabisco was an official
sponsor or was somehow associated with the Games just because it
mentioned that ancient Olympians ate figs.
The Winter and Summer Olympic Games of 1992 both shared the
stage with a hotly contested battle between the International Olympic
Committee and American Express over the latter’s alleged use of
ambush marketing tactics during the Games. Visa had paid $20
million to be one of twelve official sponsors of the Games that year,
while rival credit card company American Express had not paid to
27
become an official sponsor. During the Winter Games that took
place in France, American Express ran television ads that referred
28
generally to “winter fun and games” and depicted the French Alps.
The ads did not use any registered Olympic symbols or the word
29
“Olympic.”
The IOC nevertheless threatened suit, and Richard
Pound, the Olympic Committee’s marketing official, claimed that the
ads sought to confuse consumers into believing American Express
30
was an Olympic sponsor, and later preposterously asserted that such
31
practices were “unethical” and constituted “stealing.” Apparently,
the IOC determined that the argument that American Express’s ads
created confusion was much weaker than Pound had proclaimed,
32
because the case never went to court. Furthermore, the American
Express commercials may have been somewhat justified by the fact
that Visa’s initial ads during the Games had taken a direct shot at its
rival, telling viewers that “The Olympics Don’t Take American
33
Express.”
During the Summer Games of 1992 in Barcelona, American
Express ran several more television commercials that the IOC and its
sponsor Visa criticized as harmful ambush marketing. The ads used
language that evoked the Summer Olympics, with one concluding
“And remember, to visit Spain, you don’t need a visa,” and another
telling viewers that “Obviously, we’re here for more than just the fun

27. Martha T. Moore, Plastic War: IOC to Sue AmEx Over Ads, USA TODAY, Feb.
6, 1992, at 1A.
28. Sheridan, supra note 6, at 32.
29. Id.
30. Stuart Elliot, American Express Replies to Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1992, at
D18.
31. Stuart Elliot, Jousting by Mass Marketers is the Newest Olympic Sport, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 1992, at D1.
32. Schmitz, supra note 8, at 205 n.15.
33. Moore, supra note 27.
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34

and games.” At least the first of these ads was highly unlikely to
have confused consumers because it was an obvious shot at the
official sponsorship status of Visa through a play on words. The pun
essentially prevented both the possibility of confusion between the
two companies, as well as any confusion over who, between them, was
the official sponsor of the event. And although there is little doubt
that the other ad’s reference to “fun and games” directed viewers’
minds to the Olympics, it would be a stretch to suggest that it
somehow confused consumers as to whether American Express was
associated with the Olympics.
The ability to prevent a company from even referencing the
existence of the Olympics in a way that does not cause confusion
would be a dramatic departure from trademark law’s primary
rationale of preventing consumer confusion as to source of origin or
sponsorship. The American Express ads during the 1992 Games
might have disrupted Visa’s desire to be the only credit card company
that could advertise with content that was in any way related to the
Olympics, but trademark law is only intended to prohibit commercial
competition that is unfair, i.e., practices that are likely to confuse
35
Trademark law is not intended to provide a
consumers.
competition-free commercial environment. It appears as though it
would have been difficult to argue that American Express’s
marketing somehow unfairly or unethically associated itself with the
1992 Olympics, but if the IOC had actually believed that there was a
real possibility of consumer confusion as to American Express’s
association with the 1992 Games and that such confusion had caused
any harm, it would unquestionably have had a valid claim under the
36
Lanham Act.
An excellent example of an overly broad ambush claim that
37
actually made it to court is USOC v. American Media, Inc. In this
case, the United States Olympic Committee filed suit against
American Media Inc. (“AMI”) for allegedly “ambushing” the 2000
Olympic Games in Sydney by publishing a magazine prior to those

34. Elliot, supra note 31.
35. Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 767–68 (1992) (The Lanham Act was
intended to make “actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks” and “to protect
persons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair competition” (citing § 45, 15 U.S.C. §
1127)); Mattel Inc. v. MCA Records Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]rademark
law grants relief only against uses that are likely to confuse.”).
36. See 505 U.S. at 780 (quoting New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of California, Inc., 595
F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1979).
37. USOC v. Am. Media, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (D. Colo. 2001).
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Games entitled “OLYMPICS USA” that contained unauthorized
38
uses both of the Olympic symbol and the word “Olympic.” The
magazine contained several layouts describing thirty-two different
Olympic events with photographs of athletes participating in each
39
AMI’s publication also included profiles of featured
event.
American athletes and an event and broadcast schedule of the
40
upcoming Sydney Olympics. The magazine contained a disclaimer
on the table of contents page that denied any affiliation with or
41
sanction by the USOC.
The USOC brought suit against AMI under the Amateur Sports
Act of 1978 (“ASA”), which provides the USOC with far greater
protection over its marks than traditional trademark law under the
Lanham Act. Under the ASA “the USOC need not prove that a
contested use [of its marks] is likely to cause confusion, and an
unauthorized user of the [marks] does not have available the normal
42
Curiously, the USOC did not also allege a
statutory defenses.”
43
violation of the Lanham Act. The USOC claimed that AMI had
violated the ASA by using the USOC’s marks “for the purpose of
trade and to induce the sale of goods,” and to pass off its magazine as
44
if it were authorized by the USOC. The USOC drew particular
attention to the fact that AMI’s magazine used the word “Olympic”
on its cover, that it contained “Olympic 2000” at least thirty-five
times, and that it made various other unauthorized uses of Olympic
marks and terminology such as depictions of medals, the Olympic
45
torch and flame, and silhouettes referring to various Olympic events.
AMI moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the USOC had failed to
state a valid claim because its magazine was an editorial publication
46
that was non-commercial in nature, and therefore the ASA did not
47
apply.
The District Court for the District of Colorado agreed with AMI
that its magazine was noncommercial speech and held that the ASA

38. Id. at 1203.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. (a violation of the Lanham Act would have required proof of a likelihood of
consumer confusion).
42. Id. (citing S.F. Arts and Athletics, Inc. v. USOC, 483 U.S. 522, 531 (1987)).
43. Id. at 1210.
44. Id. at 1203.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1204.
47. Id.
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does not apply to the use of the USOC’s marks in non-commercial
48
speech. The court went on to state that although the ASA does not
provide the USOC with protection over its marks used in noncommercial speech, the Lanham Act could nevertheless provide
protection if AMI’s noncommercial use of the USOC’s marks
suggested official endorsement, authorization, or involvement by the
49
USOC in publishing its magazine. However, since the USOC had
not alleged or proved a Lanham Act violation, the court could not
address such a claim. If the USOC had alleged a Lanham violation, it
would have had to prove that there was a likelihood that consumers
would have been confused as to whether AMI was affiliated with or
50
endorsed by the USOC. The court granted the USOC leave to
51
amend its complaint to allege a violation of the Lanham Act, but the
USOC chose not to do so, likely because it determined it could not
prove that consumers were likely to be confused into thinking that
AMI’s magazine was authorized or endorsed by the USOC.
C. What Really Lies at Stake in Ambush Marketing?

Many have argued that the so-called ambush marketing tactics
described above “threaten the USOC’s ability to raise financial
52
resources.” The threat is often portrayed as having the most dire
consequences for high-profile athletic event organizers such as the
USOC. Patrick Sheridan argues that “the danger of ambush
marketing is not only consumer confusion, but also the potential loss
53
of millions of dollars in future sponsorship fees.” On an even more
alarming note, John Tripodi and Max Sutherland stated that “ambush
marketing poses a serious threat to the longevity of sponsorship as a
54
cost-effective promotional tool,” and that it “risks devaluing official,
corporate sponsorships and could conceivably threaten the financial
55
viability of sporting events . . . like the Olympics.”
Noelle Nish
asserts:
Why would PowerBar, Inc. pay millions of dollars for the
privilege of becoming the official nutrition bar of the

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 1209.
Id. at 1210.
Id.
Nish, supra note 8, at 54.
Sheridan, supra note 6, at 32.
Tripodi, supra note 11, at 420.
Id.
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Olympics if Nabisco, Inc. could step in with the Fig Newton
and create the impression that it was the official sponsor? The
56
answer probably is, that it wouldn’t.
And the USOC itself warned in its complaint against AMI that an
adverse ruling would threaten its contractual relationships with
57
official sponsors, broadcasters, and licensees.
In response to “the sky is falling” hysterics over ambush
marketing, Steve McKelvey makes the important point that “the
Olympic Movement has historically argued that ambush marketing
will result in the demise of its official sponsorship program and
revenue. And yet, despite the continuance of ambush marketing,
58
Olympic sponsorship fees escalate each quadrennial.” The fact is
that the IOC collected more than $1.4 billion from all corporate
59
sponsorships between 2001 and 2004. Under The Olympic Partner
Program (“TOP”) alone, the IOC’s highest tier of sponsorship,
“revenue has exploded in recent years, growing from nine TOP
sponsors contributing $96 million in the 1985–1988 period to eleven
60
sponsors contributing $866 million for the 2005–2008 period.”
Despite their alleged fear that the prevalence of ambush marketing
61
threatens their potential to secure future sponsorships, Olympic
organizers nevertheless estimate that the TOP sponsorship revenue
for the London Games in 2012 could increase to record levels as high
62
as $1.5 billion.
It appears that the most serious threat posed by ambush
marketing is the indiscriminate use of the term itself. Event
organizers such as the IOC and its official sponsors often seek to quell
speech by non-Olympic sponsors that capitalizes on the mere
occurrence of the Games—which are enjoyed and cherished by the
world public at-large—even when there is no threat that such speech
is likely to confuse consumers as to the speaker’s relationship to the
Olympic Movement. Because the IOC requires national organizing
committees of potential host countries to secure protection of the
Olympic marks and to enact special-event legislation designed to

56. Nish, supra note 8, at 71.
57. USOC v. Am. Media, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1210 (D. Colo., 2001).
58. McKelvey, supra note 19.
59. Jenifer Donatuti, Can China Protect the Olympics, or Should the Olympics be
Protected From China?, 15 J. OF INTELL.PROP. L. 203, 207 (2007).
60. Id.
61. See USOC v Am. Media Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d at 1210.
62. Id. at 208.
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63

curtail ambush marketing, there is legitimate reason to fear that
freedom of speech will be at least one casualty in its campaign to kill
ambush marketing. For example, Canada passed special-event
legislation for the 2010 Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver that “so
infringed upon the commercial speech rights of local businesses and
constitutional rights of local citizens that the Vancouver-based British
Columbia Civil Liberties Association and others successfully sued the
64
city for less restrictive measures.”

IV. U.S. Trademark and Unfair Competition Law
An examination of the applicable provisions of the Lanham Act
and unfair competition case law in the United States will help
demonstrate that the typical allegations of ambush marketing are
usually much ado about nothing. Again, ambush marketing is
predominantly defined as “a company’s attempt to capitalize on the
goodwill, reputation, and popularity of a particular event by creating
an association without the authorization or consent of the necessary
65
As will be discussed below, the Lanham Act and the
parties.”
existing case law clearly prohibit advertising that is confusing or
misleading as to sponsorship or association. The important point to
make here is that marketing that capitalizes on the occurrence of an
athletic event does not ipso facto create a wrongful association with
that event or indicate an attempt to create a wrongful association with
that event. If there is no likelihood that a particular marketing tactic
has created a wrongful association with an event in the minds of
consumers, then no problem exists and that tactic cannot fall into the
category of ambush marketing as defined above. The real issue
underlying most allegations of ambush marketing is the desire to
prohibit all unpaid-for speech by competitors of official sponsors that
in any way occurs during or references a sponsored athletic event,
regardless of whether it creates any confusion as to association or
sponsorship status.
The concept of ambush marketing, if accurately defined, is
essentially no different from the concept of false association, for
which there is an extensive body of case law under the Lanham Act.
Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act states:

63. Long, supra note 12, at 436.
64. McKelvey, supra note 19.
65. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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Any person who . . . uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol,or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation oforigin, false misleading description of fact, or
false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . (A) is
likely to cause confusion, or tocause mistake, or to deceive as
to the affiliation, connection, orassociation of such person
with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities
66
by another person, shall be liable in a civil action. . . .
The following are examples of only a few of the many cases that
analyze false association under the Lanham Act and are applicable to
the factual circumstances of most allegations of ambush marketing:
67
68
Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., and
69
Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc. The crux of a false association
analysis under these cases lies in the likelihood of consumer
confusion, and confusion as to a non-sponsor’s association with an
athletic event is the primary issue in any ambush marketing
allegation.
A. Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan

In Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, defendant Sullivan was an
apparel retailer and defendant Beau Tease, Inc. was an apparel
70
distributer. The defendants had been imprinting and selling shirts
with the name “Boston Marathon” and other terms including the
71
years of the races since 1978.
The Boston Athletic Association
(“BAA”), the organization that annually conducts the Boston
Marathon, registered its marks “Boston Marathon” and “BAA
Marathon” in 1983 and subsequently began licensing those marks to
72
defray the costs of the race. A retailer named Image Impact had
entered into an exclusive license with the BAA to use its registered
73
marks on shirts beginning in 1986. Defendants had not secured
licenses from the BAA to use its marks. Instead, the defendants

66.
(2006).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Lanham (Trademark) Act, § 43(a)(1)(A) (2006), (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A))
Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1989).
Pirone v. Macmillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1990).
Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981).
Boston Athletic Ass’n, 867 F.2d at 24.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 25.
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began producing and selling shirts in the Boston area imprinted with
“1986 Marathon” and a picture of runners above the words
74
“Hopkinton-Boston.” Thus, the defendants had carefully avoided
copying any of the BAA’s marks on their shirts. However, the BAA
nevertheless filed suit in federal court, alleging confusion as to
75
sponsorship in violation of the Lanham Act.
The District Court held that the BAA’s rights did not extend
beyond the use of the exact marks it had registered, and that there
was no confusion between the defendants’ and plaintiffs’ shirts, and
76
therefore ruled in favor of the defendants. The BAA appealed, and
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed. The First Circuit
stated that the central issue was a likelihood of confusion under the
77
The court noted that the case was not a typical
Lanham Act.
trademark infringement case in respect to the BAA’s claim because
the defendants were using the Boston Marathon, sponsored and
operated by the BAA, “to promote the sale of goods which are
78
adorned so as to capitalize on the race.” The court thus determined
that the “likelihood of confusion” inquiry should focus upon
“whether the purchasing public is likely to believe that the sponsor of
the Boston Marathon produces, licenses, or otherwise endorses
79
defendants’ shirts.” This states precisely the problem that the IOC
and others allege to be at issue with ambush marketing.
The First Circuit stated that the BAA had the burden of showing
that prospective purchasers were in fact likely to be confused or
misled into thinking that the defendants’ shirts were produced,
80
licensed, or sponsored by the plaintiff. The court held that even
though the defendants had not used the plaintiff’s marks, “there can
be no doubt that the language and design on defendants’ shirts
intentionally calls attention to an event that has long been sponsored
and supported by the BAA,” and that the shirts were “clearly
designed to take advantage of the Boston Marathon and to benefit
81
from the good will associated with its promotion by [the BAA].”
The court even lowered the BAA’s burden of proving likelihood of
confusion by stating that the BAA was not required to prove that
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. (The Boston Marathon race route begins in Hopkinton and ends in Boston.)
Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 28–29.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
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members of the public would conclude that the defendants’ shirts
82
were officially sponsored by the BAA. The court ruled in favor of
the BAA, holding that purchasers were likely to be confused about
the source or sponsorship of defendants’ shirts, and that the
83
defendants had thus violated the Lanham Act.
B. Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc.

In Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., defendant MacMillan published
“The 1988 MacMillan Baseball Engagement Calendar,” which
contained photos of several baseball players, among them three
84
photos of Babe Ruth. The calendar’s title, its back cover, the title
page, and the copyright page all prominently referred to the
MacMillan Publishing Company, and the words “Babe Ruth” did not
85
appear on the cover. Ruth had received compensation for the use of
his name or his picture in the promotion of various products when he
was alive, and after his death his daughters Dorothy Ruth Pirone and
Julia Ruth Stevens registered the words “Babe Ruth” as a
86
Pirone and Stevens had subsequently granted an
trademark.
amateur baseball league a license to use the “Babe Ruth” mark to
87
promote itself and sell various products. As a result of MacMillan’s
use of Ruth’s images in the calendar, Pirone filed suit in federal court
alleging trademark infringement and unfair competition alongside
88
other state law claims.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York granted
MacMillan’s motion for summary judgment on Pirone’s trademark
89
and unfair competition claims, and the Second Circuit affirmed. It
held that, while Pirone had established a valid trademark in the words
“Babe Ruth,” she was incorrect in believing that her rights in those
90
Because
marks also included every photo ever taken of Ruth.
MacMillan’s calendar used the name and image of Babe Ruth to
identify a great baseball player rather than as a trademark to identify

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 34.
Pirone v. Macmillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1990).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 581, 585.
Id. at 582 (2d Cir. 1990).
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the source of the calendar, the court held that the use did not
91
constitute trademark infringement.
Under Pirone’s unfair competition claim, the court stated that
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act “is violated by the use of any
‘symbol’ as a ‘false designation of origin’ or as any ‘false
92
representation,’ whether or not a trademark is involved.” This rule
deals specifically with any use of symbols that may be misleading as to
sponsorship, and is thus directly applicable to any allegation of
ambush marketing described earlier in this article. In this case, the
court held that pictures of Ruth were symbols, but that they did not
indicate the origin or represent sponsorship of MacMillan’s
93
calendar.
The Second Circuit went on to state that “the crucial determinant
in an action for trademark infringement or unfair competition is
‘whether there is any likelihood that an appreciable number of
ordinary prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply
94
confused, as to the source of the goods in question.’” The court
further clarified that “the public’s belief that the mark’s owner
sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the trademark satisfies
95
the confusion requirement.” Because the source of publication was
clearly indicated with numerous and prominent references to
96
MacMillan, and because the photos of Ruth were among photos of
many others featured in MacMillan’s calendar, the court reasoned
that “an ordinary prudent purchaser would have no difficulty
discerning that these photos . . . do not in any way indicate
97
sponsorship. No reasonable jury could find likelihood of confusion.”
C. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc.

In Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., Warner Brothers sued
Gay Toys over the latter’s manufacture of a toy car similar to the 1969
Dodge Charger, known as the “General Lee” and driven by the main
characters in Warner Brothers’ popular television series “The Dukes
98
of Hazzard.” Warner Brothers had refused to grant Gay Toys a
license to use its “Dukes of Hazzard” trademarks, so Gay Toys
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 584.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 585.
Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1981).
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labeled its toy as the “Dixie Racer,” reversed the door numerals from
the “01” that appeared on the “General Lee” to “10” and refrained
99
from calling its toy car the “General Lee.” However, the toy car was
identical to the Warner Brothers’ “General Lee” in most other
100
Warner Brothers contended that the defendant’s toy
respects.
violated Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act because the “Dixie Racer”
caused consumer confusion in the public’s mind as to the manufacture
101
Warner Brothers also contended
and sponsorship of the toy car.
that the defendant’s car “[gave] rise to the assumption by the public
that Gay Toys’ ‘Dixie Racer’ [was] an authorized reproduction of the
102
‘General Lee.’”
The District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in
favor of Gay Toys on Warner Brothers’ motion for a preliminary
injunction, holding that there could be no proof of confusion because
103
Warner Brothers was not in the business of manufacturing toy cars.
The issue on appeal before the Second Circuit was whether the
District Court erred in finding that Warner Brothers failed to show a
likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of the
104
defendant’s “Dixie Racer.” The Second Circuit reversed the lower
court, finding that there was a sufficient likelihood of confusion as to
105
the source and sponsorship of the “Dixie Racer.” The court stated
that “the basic inquiry in an unfair competition action is whether the
public is likely to be misled into believing that the defendant is
distributing products manufactured or vouched for by the plaintiff,”
and that only proof of a likelihood of confusion or deception as
opposed to proof of actual confusion need be shown to obtain
106
Under this standard, the court assessed Warner
equitable relief.
Brothers’ evidence of a survey that showed eighty percent of children
had identified the “Dixie Racer” as the “General Lee” or as “The
Dukes of Hazzard Car,” and had thus assumed that Warner Brothers
107
As such, the court held that Warner
had sponsored the toy car.
Brothers had proved a likelihood of confusion as to the sponsorship

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 77.
Id.
Id. at 78.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 79.
Id.
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of the defendant’s “Dixie Racer” and reversed the District Court’s
108
order denying Warner Brothers’ request for an injunction.

V. Case Law Summary and Ambush Allegation Analysis
The three cases discussed in the previous section are only a few
examples of an exhaustive body of case law on unfair competition and
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. All three cases
demonstrate that the United States has a legal framework in place
designed specifically to deal with any activity that is deceptive or
likely to cause confusion in the marketplace as to association or
sponsorship.
To receive injunctive relief against an allegedly
deceptive or confusing practice, a plaintiff must only prove a
likelihood of confusion as to association or sponsorship, not actual
109
confusion.
In Boston Athletic Ass’n the First Circuit held that the public was
likely to be confused by the defendants’ shirts as to their association
with the organizer of the Boston Marathon, even though the
110
defendants had not used any of the plaintiff’s trademarks.
Similarly, in Warner Bros. the Second Circuit held that the
defendant’s “Dixie Racer” toy car was likely to confuse the public as
to its association with the Warner Brothers television series “The
Dukes of Hazard,” even though the toy did not copy any of Warner
111
Brothers’ trademarks. However, in Pirone the plaintiff was unable
to provide any evidence that consumers were likely to have been
confused as to whether the owners of the “Babe Ruth” mark
112
sponsored or endorsed the defendant’s baseball calendar.
Ambush marketing strategies allegedly attempt to “capitalize on
the goodwill, reputation, and popularity of a particular event by
creating an association without the authorization or consent of the
113
necessary parties.”
If marketing tactics alleged to be “ambushes”
are in fact likely to cause consumer confusion as to a company’s
association with an event such as the Olympics, then under the
Lanham Act case law discussed above, event organizers and official
event sponsors would undoubtedly have recognizable claims in
108. Id. at 79–80.
109. Id. at 79; Kellie L. Pendras, Revisiting San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. USOC:
Why It is Time to Narrow Protection of the Word “Olympic,” 24 HAW. L. REV. 729, 731–32
(2002).
110. Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 1989).
111. Warner Bros., Inc., 658 F.2d at 78.
112. Pirone v. Macmillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 585 (2d Cir. 1990).
113. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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federal court. Yet, for all of the past allegations of ambush marketing
during high profile athletic events such as the Olympics over the last
114
three decades, few ambush cases have ever gone to trial, which begs
the question as to why.
Patrick Sheridan answers that question in a way that
unintentionally dispels the controversy over ambush marketing and
demonstrates the glaring contradictions inherent in the all-too115
frequent allegations of the practice. Like most who complain about
the constant threat of ambush marketing, Sheridan argues that the
practice poses the serious danger of consumer confusion as to
116
association with an athletic event. However, his proposed solution
is to do away with the plaintiff’s traditional burden under the Lanham
Act of having to prove a “likelihood of confusion” with an alleged
ambush marketer’s tactics because, according to him, that threshold is
117
too difficult to meet in most ambush cases. Thus, Sheridan believes
that the definitive problem with so-called ambush marketing tactics is
that they supposedly confuse consumers, but most complainants have
been so far from being able to prove that confusion is likely that they
have not even attempted to take their claims into court. Drawing the
obvious conclusion from his proposal to lower our unfair competition
law standards to the point where plaintiffs would not have to prove
that the advertising is unfair, Sheridan asserts “If sports organizations
did not have to meet the current likelihood of confusion burden, they
would likely litigate more ambush marketing claims using trademark
118
law and receive successful results.”

VI. Conclusion
If any of the practices that are typically categorized as ambush
marketing during a high-profile athletic event are likely to cause
confusion as to the alleged ambusher’s association with the event,
then the Lanham Act provides adequate protection. Under the
Lanham Act, event organizers are even spared the burden of proving
that a particular marketing practice or advertisement actually

114. Sheridan, supra note 6, at 29.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 32.
117. Id. at 29–30. “[P]erhaps the most significant impediment to ambush marketing
litigation, at least under the Lanham Act, is the requirement to show consumer confusion
in an unfair competition claim.” Id. at 37. Jason Schmitz similarly concludes that “the
‘likelihood of confusion’ analysis often does not apply to the facts of ambush cases.”
Schmitz, supra note 8, at 207.
118. Sheridan, supra note 6, at 30.
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confuses consumers as to association with the event, and are required
only to prove that there is a likelihood that consumers would be
119
confused. This is a reasonable standard that both protects official
sponsorship agreements and free speech in the competitive free
market.
Because United States trademark law adequately balances free
speech interests with consumer confusion, and because it protects
markholders and businesses from actions by competitors designed to
deceive consumers, it should serve as a model for the international
community to follow when dealing with ambush marketing. The
British government especially should reevaluate its strict anti-ambush
marketing legislation prior to the 2012 Summer Olympic Games in
London. In the United States, corporate sponsors and event
organizers such as the United States Olympic Committee should
wield their allegations of ambush marketing more precisely and more
sincerely if they wish to be taken seriously by the American legal
community and the marketing departments of non-sponsoring
companies.

119. Pendras, supra note 110, at 731–32.

